no business kurima cotton murikupererwa hazvibhadare tsvagai zvinobhadhara kana kurima derere

basa Rana masuku ndere kuronga ma inputs looting programs chete apa GMB isinga bhadhare

Ndizvo zvinoita kushandiswa dzimwe nguva haupiwe pay dzimwe nguva unopiwa twumari twushoma wanoita zvavanoda neni varikutonga

ko Wadyajena akadzosa mari idya here yaakaba last time?

GMB delaying payments, Cotco delaying payments. What a useless gvt we have, they then turn around and look for saboteurs and blame sanctions. Judges and ministers got hefty housing loans yet the same gvt cannot pay farmers who are feeding the nation and earning forex.

til 237. The Commission found that after the abortive ‘Nhari Rebellion’, and particularly after the Chifombo trials over which he presided, Chitepo became a suspect and was virtually a captive in the hands of his colleagues in DARE. 238. It is clear from the evidence that those found guilty, including John Mataure and the Nhari group, were executed on the orders of Tongo- gara and the High Command and with the knowledge and connivance of Chitepo and the Karanga members of DARE. Those connected but who were not at Chifombo Chimurenga General Council, like Mukono, Muta- mbanengwe, Madekurozwa, Santana and Mpini were sentenced to death and were to be executed whenever they were found. Most of these were Manyikas like Chitepo and were very close to him. 239. The charge or belief held by the Karanga elements against the Manyikas, that the latter had instigated or organised the ‘Nhari Rebellion’ appears to the Commission to have been unfounded. There was no tenable evidence before the Commission that the Manyika master-minded the mutiny as the Karangas maintained, beyond trifling incidents that could be immediately dismissed for want of substance. At worst, the Manyika merely understood the grievances of the Nhari group and sympathised with the young men. They preferred a reconciliation rather than con- frontation with the kidnappers. 240. ZANU lacked a well institutionalised machinery for regulating and controlling its affairs. This resulted in irregular and criminal acts by the DARE and the High Command. It also accounted for much confusion in the Party, bordering on a state of anarchy. 241. Much as it was expedient to offer a wide scope to the Zimbabwe nationalists in their militant struggle for independence with minimum interference in the domestic or internal affairs of the Party organisation, the necessary pre-requisite of ensuring that the freedom fighters prosecute their aims and conduct themselves in Zambia within the bounds of pro- priety and legality was not strictly observed by the Zambian Authorities. The latitude allowed by the host country far exceeded these lines, and it is apparent that the Government of Zambia did not keep a watchful eye on all the activities of the liberation movements operating within their territory. The Government assumed that liberation movements had their own intra-Party machinery for disciplinary and orientation purposes. ZANU, for instance, was regarded as a sort of Sovereign Government-in- exile, hence the non-interference in the conduct of its internal affairs. 242. In the matter of the security of Zimbabwe nationals in the political activity of freeing their country, the Zambian Government could be said to have done all that could possibly be done in the circumstances. Sufficient security measures were taken wherever there were freedom fighters, including the Liberation Centro itself, the Headquarters of all liberation movements in Lusaka.

Chaora chiCompany ichi 🙉🙉🙉