· 1 week ago
few years ago, a mining company was considering
reopening an old mine shaft in Welkom, a city in South
Africa’s interior. Welkom was once the center of the
world’s richest goldfields. There were close to fifty shafts in
an area roughly the size of Brooklyn, but most of these mines
had been shut down in the past three decades. Large deposits
of gold remained, though the ore was of poor grade and
situated at great depths, making it prohibitively expensive to
mine on an industrial scale. The shafts in Welkom were
among the deepest that had ever been sunk, plunging
vertically for a mile or more and opening, at different levels,
onto cavernous horizontal passages that narrowed toward the
gold reefs: a labyrinthine network of tunnels far beneath the
city.
Most of the surface infrastructure for this particular mine had
been dismantled several years prior, but there was still a hole
in the ground—a concrete cylinder roughly seven thousand
feet deep. To assess the mine’s condition, a team of spe****ts
lowered a camera down the shaft with a winding machine
designed for rescue missions. The footage shows a darkened
tunnel, some thirty feet in diameter, with an internal frame of
large steel girders. The camera descends at five feet per
second. At around eight hundred feet, moving figures appear
in the distance, travelling downward at almost the same
speed. It is two men sliding down the girders. They have
neither helmets nor ropes, and their forearms are protected
by sawed-off gum boots. The camera continues its descent,
leaving the men in darkness. Twisted around the horizontal
beams below them—at sixteen hundred feet, at twenty-six
hundred feet—are corpses: the remains of men who have
fallen, or perhaps been thrown, to their deaths. The bottom
third of the shaft is badly damaged, preventing the camera
from going farther. If there are other bodies, they may never
be found.
s Welkom’s mining industry collapsed, in the nineteen-
nineties, a dystopian criminal economy emerged in its
place, with thousands of men entering the abandoned
tunnels and using rudimentary tools to dig for the leftover
ore. With few overhead costs or safety standards, these
outlaw miners, in some cases, could strike it rich. Many
others remained in poverty, or died underground. The miners
became known as zama-zamas , a Zulu term that loosely
translates to “take a chance.” Most were immigrants from
neighboring countries—Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Lesotho—
that once sent millions of mine workers to South Africa, and
whose economies were heavily dependent on mining wages.
“You started seeing these new men in the townships,” Pitso
Tsibolane, a man who grew up in Welkom, explained to me.
“They’re not dressed like locals, don’t talk like locals—they’re
just there. And then they vanish, and you know they’re back
underground.”
Owing to the difficulty of entering the mines, zama-zamas
often stayed underground for months, their existence
illuminated by headlamps. Down below, temperatures can
exceed a hundred degrees, with suffocating humidity.
Rockfalls are common, and rescuers have encountered bodies
crushed by boulders the size of cars. “I think they all go
through hell,” a doctor in Welkom, who has treated dozens of
zama-zamas , told me. The men he saw had turned gray for
lack of sunlight, their bodies were emaciated, and most of
them had tuberculosis from inhaling dust in the unventilated
tunnels. They were blinded for hours upon returning to the
surface.
I recently met a zama-zama named Simon who once lived
underground for two years. Born in a rural area of
Zimbabwe, he arrived in Welkom in 2010. He started digging
for gold at the surface, which was dusted with ore from the
industry’s heyday. There was gold beside the railway tracks
that had once transported rock from the mines, gold among
the foundations of torn-down processing plants, gold in the
beds of ephemeral streams. But Simon was earning only
around thirty-five dollars a day. He aspired to build a house
and open a business. To get more gold, he would need to go
underground.
In no other country in the world does illegal mining take
place inside such colossal industrial shafts. In the past twenty
years, zama-zamas have spread across South Africa’s gold-
mining areas, becoming a national crisis. Analysts have
estimated that illegal mining accounts for around a tenth of
South Africa’s annual gold production, though mining
companies, wary of alarming investors, tend to downplay the
extent of the criminal trade. The operations underground are
controlled by powerful syndicates, which then launder the
gold into legal supply chains. The properties that have made
gold useful as a store of value—notably the ease with which it
can be melted down into new forms—also make it difficult to
trace. A wedding band, a cell-phone circuit board, and an
investment coin may all contain gold that was mined by
zama-zamas .
Welkom, once an economic engine of the apartheid state,
emerged as an early—and especially dire—hot spot for illegal
mining. Since 2007, officials in the Free State province, where
Welkom is situated, have recovered the bodies of more than
seven hundred zama-zamas —but not all deaths are reported
to the authorities, and many bodies remain belowground.
“We call it the zama graveyard,” a forensic officer said in a
2017 news interview, following an underground explosion
that killed more than forty people. In decommissioned mines,
the ventilation systems no longer function, and harmful gases
accumulate. At certain concentrations of methane, a mine
becomes a bomb that can be detonated by the merest spark;
even rocks knocking against each other can set off a blast. In
Johannesburg, about a hundred and fifty miles northeast of
Welkom, there are fears that illegal miners may cause gas
pipelines to explode, including those beneath Africa’s largest
soccer stadium.
But perhaps the biggest dangers stem from the syndicates
that have seized control of the illicit gold economy. Organized
crime is rampant in South Africa—“an existential threat,”
according to a recent analysis from the Global Initiative
Against Transnational Organized Crime—and gold-mining
gangs are especially notorious. Armed militias war over turf,
both at the surface and underground, carrying out raids and
executions. Officials have discovered groups of corpses that
have been bludgeoned with hammers or had their throats slit.
In Welkom, getting underground became impossible without
paying protection fees to the criminal groups in charge. By
2015, just nine shafts were still operating, in spots where
there was ore of sufficient grade to justify the expense of
hauling it out. Some syndicates took advantage of these
shafts, bribing employees to let the zama-zamas ride “the
cage”—the transport elevator—and then walk to areas where
mining had ceased. There were also dozens of abandoned
shafts, including separate ventilation channels and ducts for
subsurface cables. “Companies have difficulty plugging all the
holes,” a 2009 report on illegal mining noted. Each of these
provided openings for zama-zamas . The miners climbed
down ladders made of sticks and conveyor-belt rubber, which
deteriorated over time and sometimes snapped. Or they were
lowered into the darkness by teams of men, or behind
vehicles that reversed slowly for a mile or farther, the ropes
feeding over makeshift pulleys above the shaft. Sometimes
the ropes would break, or a patrol would arrive, causing the
men at the surface to let go. There were stories of syndicates
deceiving miners, promising them a ride in the cage, only to
force them to climb down the girders. Men who refused were
thrown over the edge, with some victims taking around
twenty seconds to hit the bottom.
In 2015, Simon entered the mines by paying a thousand
dollars to a local syndicate boss, known as David One Eye,
who allowed him to walk into the tunnels via an inclined
shaft just south of Welkom. One Eye, a former zama-zama
himself, had risen from obscurity to become one of the most
fearsome figures in the region. He was powerfully built from
lifting weights, and he had lost his left eye in a shooting.
The syndicate would charge Simon more than twice as much
to exit the mines. He remained underground for almost a
year, subsisting on food provided by One Eye’s runners. He
came away with too little money, so he went into the mines
again, paying the same syndicate to lower him with a rope.
He became accustomed to life underground: the heat, the
dust, the darkness. He planned to remain there until he was
no longer poor, but in the end he came out because he was
starving.
ama-zamas are a nightmarish late chapter in an industry
that, more than any other, has shaped South Africa’s
history. Surface-level gold deposits were discovered in the
area that became Johannesburg, sparking a gold rush in 1886.
Twelve years later, the new South African mines were
providing a quarter of the world’s gold. (To date, the country
has produced more than forty per cent of all the gold ever
mined.)
The reefs that outcropped in Johannesburg extend deep
underground, making up part of the Witwatersrand basin, a
geological formation that stretches in an arc two hundred and
fifty miles long. Extracting this gold required tremendous
inputs of labor and capital. The Chamber of Mines once
likened the basin to “a fat 1,200-page dictionary lying at an
angle. The gold bearing reef would be thinner than a single
page, and the amount of gold contained therein would hardly
cover a couple of commas.” Complicating matters further, this
page had been “twisted and torn” by geological forces,
leaving fragments “thrust between other leaves of the book.”
In the nineteen-thirties, mining companies began prospecting
in a different province—a sp****ly populated area that would
later be called the Free State. After the Second World War,
one borehole produced a sample “so astonishing that
financial editors refused to believe the press release,” the
historian Jade Davenport wrote, in “Digging Deep: A History
of Mining in South Africa.” The yield was more than five
hundred times richer than a usual profitable return,
propelling the international gold-shares market “into
complete dementia.” Land values in the nearest village
increased more than two-hundredfold within a week.
But these new goldfields needed to be developed from
scratch. There was no electricity or potable water. Vast maize
fields spread across the grasslands. In 1947, a mining house
called the Anglo American Corporation received permission
to establish a new town, to be called Welkom—“welcome” in
Afrikaans. The company’s founder, Ernest Oppenheimer, who
was the richest man in South Africa, tasked a British planner
named William Backhouse with designing the settlement.
Inspired by housing developments in England, Backhouse
envisaged a garden city with satellite towns and ample
greenbelts. There would be wide boulevards and circles to
direct the flow of traffic. At the outset, Oppenheimer’s son
wrote, the region was “depressing in the extreme”: flat and
featureless, choked by frequent dust storms, with a single
acacia tree, which was later designated a local monument.
Eventually, the city was planted with more than a million
trees.
Across South Africa, white mine workers were perpetually in
demand, owing to laws that limited Black people to menial
and labor-intensive jobs. To attract white workers and skilled
technicians away from the Witwatersrand, the Anglo
American Corporation built subsidized houses in Welkom,
along with lavish recreational facilities such as cricket fields
and a horse-riding club. By 1950, Welkom was growing at an
average rate of two families per day. “Welkom is going to be
the showplace of South Africa!” the national finance minister
declared on an official visit.
The economic logic of the mines also demanded an
inexhaustible supply of cheap Black labor. Restricted from
unionizing until the late nineteen-seventies, Black mine
workers performed gruelling and dangerous tasks, such as
wielding heavy drills in cramped spaces and shovelling rock;
tens of thousands died in accidents, and many more
contracted lung diseases. To prevent competition among
companies, which would have driven up wages, the Chamber
of Mines operated as a central recruiting agency for Black
workers from across Southern Africa; between 1910 and 1960,
according to one estimate, five million mine workers
travelled between South Africa and Mozambique alone.
Expanding the labor pool helped the mining industry depress
Black wages, which remained almost static for more than five
decades. By 1969, the pay gap between white and Black
workers had reached twenty to one.
In Welkom, a separate township was built for Black residents,
set apart from the city by an industrial area and two mine
dumps. One of the city planners’ main goals, according to a
history of Welkom from the nineteen-sixties, was to “prevent
the outskirts of the town being marred by Bantu squatters.”
Named Thabong, or “Place of Joy,” the township lay in the
path of the dust from the mines. Segregated mining towns,
which dated back to the nineteenth century, laid a foundation
for South Africa’s apartheid system, which was formally
introduced the year after Welkom was founded. Every
evening, a siren sounded at seven o’clock, announcing a
curfew for Black people, who faced arrest if they stayed too
late in the white part of town.
ppenheimer had imagined Welkom as “a town of
permanence and beauty.” The cornerstone of the civic
center, an imposing set of buildings laid out in the shape
of a horseshoe, was a twenty-four-inch slab of gold-bearing
reef. The council chambers were furnished in walnut, with
crystal chandeliers imported from Vienna. There was a
banquet hall and one of South Africa’s finest theatres. In 1971,
just three years after the complex was unveiled, a guidebook
to South African architecture described the design as
“perhaps too ambitious for a town which will, in all
probability, have a limited life.”
The crash came in 1989. The price of gold had fallen by
nearly two-thirds from its peak, inflation was rising, and
investors were wary of instability during South Africa’s
transition to democracy. (Nelson Mandela was freed the
following year.) The rise of powerful unions, in the final years
of apartheid, meant that it was no longer possible for the
industry to pay Black workers “slave wages,” as the former
chairman of one large mining company told me. The Free
State goldfields eventually laid off more than a hundred and
fifty thousand mine workers, or eighty per cent of the
workforce. The region was almost wholly reliant on mining,
and Welkom’s economy was especially undiversified. The
town’s sprawling urban design was also expensive to
maintain, leading to a “death spiral,” Lochner Marais, a
professor of developmental studies at the University of the
Free State, told me.
I first visited Welkom in late 2021. As I drove into the city,
Google Maps announced that I had arrived, but around me it
was dark. Then my headlights picked out a suburban home,
followed by another. The entire neighborhood was without
electricity. South Africa is in the midst of an energy crisis and
experiences frequent scheduled power outages, but that was
not the cause of this blackout. Rather, it was symptomatic of
chronic local dysfunction, in a municipality ranked South
Africa’s second worst in a 2021 report on financial
sustainability.
Welkom is surrounded by enormous flat-topped mine dumps
that rise from the plains like mesas. The roads have been
devoured by potholes. Several years ago, zama-zamas began
breaking open wastewater pipes to process gold ore, which
requires large volumes of water. They also attacked sewage
plants, extracting gold from the sludge itself. Now untreated
sewage flows in the streets. In addition, zama-zamas stripped
copper cables from around town and within the mines. Cable
theft became so rampant that Welkom experienced power
failures several times per week.
As the gold-mining companies scaled back in South Africa,
they left behind wasted landscapes and extensive
subterranean workings, including railway lines and
locomotives, intact winders and cages, and thousands of
miles of copper cable. Many companies had devised
protocols for withdrawing from depleted mines, but these
were seldom followed; likewise, government regulations
around mine closures were weakly enforced. “It’s as if they
just locked the door—‘Now we’re done,’ ” a mine security
officer said of the companies. Shafts were often sold many
times over, the constant changing of hands allowing
companies to evade responsibility for rehabilitation. By the
early two-thousands, according to authorities, South Africa
had a large number of “derelict and ownerless” gold mines
across the country, creating opportunities for illegal mining.
Mining researchers in South Africa sometimes joke that the
story of gold mining runs from AA to ZZ—from multinationals
like Anglo American to zama-zamas .
Authorities first became aware of the burgeoning illegal-
mining industry in the nineties. A fire broke out in one of
Welkom’s operational shafts, and a rescue team was called to
extinguish it. The team discovered several dead bodies—the
suspected victims of carbon-monoxide inhalation. The
managers of the mine were not missing any workers, and the
dead men were carrying no identification. They had been
mining illegally in a disused area. “We weren’t aware
something like this could happen,” a member of the rescue
team recalled. A few years later, in 1999, police arrested
twenty-eight zama-zamas in a nearby section of the tunnels.
The men, laid-off mine workers, knew their way around like
spelunkers in a cave network. An investigator involved in the
arrest described them to me as “the forefathers of
underground illegal mining in South Africa.”
ven before there were zama-zamas , South Africa had a
thriving black market for gold. In 1996, a security
manager at one of the country’s biggest mining houses
prepared a report about gold theft, which he described as
“the least reported and talked about criminal activity in South
Africa.” Back then, workers often pilfered gold from
processing plants. One cleaner smuggled out gold-bearing
material in a bucket of water; painters on the roof of a
facility removed gold through the air vents. An employee was
caught with gold inside his tobacco pipe; he didn’t smoke, but
had been using this method to steal for twenty years. Others
used slingshots to shoot gold over security fences or flushed
gold, wrapped in ****s, down the toilet, which they
retrieved from nearby sewage plants. One official was
observed, several times, leaving a facility with potted plants
from his office; a security officer sampled the soil, which was
rich in gold concentrate.
In Welkom, the main destination for stolen gold was in
Thabong, at a dormitory known as G Hostel. During
apartheid, hostels housed migrant workers as a way of
preventing them from settling permanently in cities; these
hostels have since become notorious for crime and violence.
G Hostel had multiple entrances and was difficult to surveil. It
functioned as an illicit smelting house, where teams of men
would crush and wash the gold, then process it into ingots.
Following the rise of zama-zamas , G Hostel developed into
one of the largest gold-smuggling centers in the country.
Eventually, around twenty-five hundred people were
crammed into the compound, many of them undocumented
immigrants. Police frequently conducted raids; in 1998,
officers recovered more than ten metric tons of gold-bearing
material. One dealer had been selling an average of a
hundred ounces of gold per day.
During a raid in the early two-thousands, police arrested a
zama-zama from Mozambique who gave his name as David
Khombi. He was wearing a white vest, tattered cutoff jeans,
and flip-flops. Khombi lived at the compound, where he
supplemented his income by cutting hair, mending shoes, andKhombi lived at the compound, where he
supplemented his income by cutting hair, mending shoes, and
tailoring Mozambican garments. Not long after the arrest, he
was released and went underground, where he earned a
small fortune, a former member of his inner circle told me.
According to an expert on the illegal gold trade in the Free
State, by 2008 Khombi had “started building his empire.”
In South Africa, gold smuggling is loosely organized into a
pyramid structure. At the bottom are the miners, who sell to
local buyers, who sell to regional buyers, who sell to national
buyers; at the top are international gold dealers. The margins
at each level are typically low—unlike many other illicit
products, the market price of gold is public—and turning a
profit requires substantial investments of capital, Marcena
Hunter, an analyst who studies illicit gold flows, told me. To
move upward, Khombi focussed his attention on a different
commodity: food.
Sustaining thousands of zama-zamas underground is a
complex and lucrative exercise in logistics. At first, many
illegal miners in the Free State purchased food from legal
mine workers, who sold their rations at inflated prices. But as
the mines laid people off, and the number of zama-zamas
grew, the syndicates began providing food directly. A new
economy developed—one that could be even more profitable
than gold. Men underground had little bargaining power, and
markups on food usually ranged from five hundred to a
thousand per cent. A loaf of bread that cost less than ten rand
at the surface sold for a hundred rand down below. Fixed
prices were set for peanuts, tinned fish, powdered milk,
Morvite (a high-energy sorghum porridge originally
developed for feeding mine workers), and biltong, a South
African jerky.
Zama-zamas could also purchase such items as cigarettes,
marijuana, washing powder, toothpaste, batteries, and
headlamps. They paid with the cash they made from selling
gold; when they were flush, some miners celebrated with
buckets of KFC, which were available underground for
upward of a thousand rand. Around a decade ago, one KFC in
Welkom was supplying so much food to gold syndicates that
customers started avoiding it: orders took forever, items on
the menu ran out, and meals were often undercooked. Police
contacted the owner, who agreed to notify them whenever
large orders came in. On one occasion, officers observed a
truck picking up eighty buckets of chicken.
Khombi began paying men to shop at wholesalers, package
the goods in layers of cardboard and bubble wrap, and then
drop the fortified parcels down the shafts. (They often used
ventilation channels, the powerful updrafts slowing the rate
at which the supplies fell.) As his earnings increased, Khombi
began buying gold from zama-zamas , profiting doubly from
their labor. He built a large house in Thabong, where he
developed a reputation for sharing his wealth—“like a
philanthropist,” one community activist told me. During his
rise to prominence, he also made enemies. He was later shot
in the face, but survived, and became known as David One
Eye.
ne afternoon, I met a former zama-zama whom I’ll refer
to as Jonathan. He spent a year in the tunnels around
2013. “We were thousands underground,” he recalled.
The men worked bare-chested because of the heat, and they
slept on makeshift bunks. Khombi controlled the supply of
food, and there were deliveries of beer and meat
—“everything,” Jonathan said. For nearly three months,
Jonathan was dependent on a group of more experienced
miners, who guided him through the tunnels and shared their
supplies. Finding and extracting gold required considerable
expertise, and some zama-zamas were able to read the rock
like mineralogists. But there were also other jobs
underground, and Jonathan found work as a welder,
producing small mills, known as pendukas , for crushing ore.
The other miners paid him in gold.
Access to the tunnels was controlled, increasingly, by armed
gangs from Lesotho, to whom Khombi paid protection fees.
Known as the Marashea, or “Russians,” these gangs traced
their origins to mining compounds on the Witwatersrand,
where Basotho laborers banded together in the nineteen-
forties. (Their name was inspired by the Russian Army,
whose members were “understood to have been fierce and
successful fighters,” the historian Gary Kynoch wrote, in “We
Are Fighting the World: A History of the Marashea Gangs in
South Africa, 1947–1999.”) The Marashea dressed in gum
boots, balaclavas, and traditional woollen blankets, worn
clasped beneath the chin. Following the rise of illegal mining,
they muscled in on the shafts. They carried weapons—assault
rifles, Uzis, shotguns—and fought viciously over abandoned
mines. Accordion players affiliated with the gangs wrote
songs taunting their enemies, like drill rappers with
nineteenth-century instruments.
Working with factions of the Marashea, Khombi seized
control of large areas of the Free State goldfields. He
structured his illicit business almost like a mine, with
separate divisions for food, gold, and security. As his wealth
grew, he and his wife acquired extravagant tastes. They built
a second home in Thabong, so ornate that it drew
comparisons to a compound built by Jacob Zuma, South
Africa’s notoriously corrupt former President. On Instagram,
Khombi posted photographs of himself wearing Italian suits
and flexing his biceps in tight-fitting tees. (One caption:
“Everyone talks about mother’s love but no one talks about a
father’s sacrifice.”) He bought a fleet of cars, including a
customized Range Rover worth an estimated quarter-million
dollars, and opened a pair of night clubs in Thabong, rising
above a sea of metal shacks. His wife, who was from an
extremely poor family, began dressing in Gucci and
Balenciaga, and often flew to Johannesburg for shopping
trips.
In the nineteen-fifties, according to Welkom records, there
were white women who “made a point of flying regularly to
Johannesburg for a day’s shopping.” Their husbands, who
worked in the mines, were “absolutely fearless, accepting
hazard and risk, with a terrific driving force to earn the
maximum possible amount of money.” The structure of the
company town guaranteed that, for its white residents, there
was plenty of money in circulation. Khombi rose to the top of
a new hierarchy, one that enriched a different set of bosses
but was similarly based on Black labor.
Today, a row of grand banks stands mostly shuttered, a putt-
putt course has been taken over by drug dealers, and the
public gardens are strewn with trash and stripped cables.
This past November, a clock tower outside the civic center,
considered one of Welkom’s landmarks, displayed a different
incorrect time on each of its three faces, with a faded banner
for an event in 2018. The commercial district has retreated
into the Goldfields Mall, which was built in the nineteen-
eighties; it has a giant statue of a rhinoceros out front. (In
December, they gave the statue a Christmas hat.)
I met a former police reservist there one morning. He asked
to be identified as Charles. For around nine years, he was on
Khombi’s payroll, selling him gold confiscated from rival
dealers, protecting him, and escorting zama-zamas to the
mines. Charles used the money to buy a new car and pay
lobola, a bride-price customary in many Southern African
cultures.
Corruption is a corrosive force in South Africa. In Welkom,
which has not received a clean financial audit since 2000, tens
of millions of dollars in government funds have gone missing.
Even in this context, Khombi’s influence was legendary.
Charles estimated that seventy per cent of the local police
force had been in the kingpin’s pocket; I took this to be an
exaggeration, until a senior detective who works on illegal-
mining cases corroborated the figure, laughing bitterly.
But Khombi, like any capable mafia don, was also propping
up core services of the city. He repaired dirt roads in
Thabong and donated supplies to local schools. In 2015, the
national electricity utility threatened to cut off power to
Welkom and its surrounding towns unless the municipality
began paying off an outstanding bill of around thirty million
dollars. Rumors circulated that Khombi had made a cash
payment to avert the power cuts.
Corruption was just as pervasive in the operational mines.
Smuggling in zama-zamas could cost as much as forty-five
hundred dollars per person, according to the illegal-gold-
mining expert. The process could require bribing up to seven
employees at once, from security guards to cage operators;
this meant that mine employees could earn many times their
regular salaries through bribery. Some were caught with
bread loaves strapped to their bellies and batteries hidden
inside their lunchboxes, which they planned to sell to zama-
zamas. They also served as couriers, ferrying gold and cash.
Mine workers who couldn’t be paid off were targeted by the
syndicates. In 2017, a Welkom mine manager known for his
tough stance against zama-zamas was murdered. Two months
later, a mine security officer was shot thirteen times on his
way to work. The following year, an administrator was
stabbed ten times at home while his wife and children were
in another room, and the wife of a plant manager was
kidnapped for a ransom of one bar of gold.
Today, after a series of acquisitions and mergers, a single
company, Harmony, owns the mines around Welkom.
Harmony specializes in exploiting marginal deposits at so-
called mature mines, which has allowed it to prosper during
the twilight years of South Africa’s gold industry. According to
a company presentation that I obtained, Harmony has spent
roughly a hundred million dollars on security measures
between 2012 and 2019, including outfitting its mines with
biometric authentication systems. They have also demolished
several dozen disused shafts. Company records show that
more than sixteen thousand zama-zamas have been arrested
since 2007; in addition, more than two thousand employees
and contractors have been arrested under suspicion of taking
bribes or facilitating illegal mining. But these arrests were
mostly at the bottom of the illegal-mining hierarchy, and had
little lasting impact.
One day, I met a team of security officers who patrolled some
of the mines beneath Welkom; several of them had worked in
Afghanistan and Iraq, and told me that the mines were more
dangerous. The officers recounted coming across explosives
the size of soccer balls, stuffed with bolts and other shrapnel.
In shoot-outs, bullets ricocheted off the mine walls. “It’s tunnel
warfare,” a member of the team said.
But in town, especially among poorer residents, there was a
sense that this violence was peripheral to a trade that
sustained a large number of people. Money from zama-zamas
spilled over into the general economy, from food wholesalers
to car dealerships. “The economy of Welkom is through zama-
zamas,” Charles, the former police reservist, told me. “Now
Welkom is poor because of one man.” A few years ago,
Khombi began ordering brazen hits on his rivals, becoming
the focal point of a wider clampdown on illegal mining. “He
took it too far,” Charles said. “He ruined it for everyone.”
he first known murder linked to Khombi was that of Eric
Vilakazi, another syndicate leader who had been
delivering food underground. In 2016, Vilakazi was shot
dead in front of his home while holding his young child in his
arms. (The child survived.) Afterward, Khombi visited
Vilakazi’s family to share his condolences and to offer
financial support for the funeral. “If he killed you, he’ll go see
the wife the next day,” the former member of Khombi’s inner
circle, who accompanied him on the visit, told me. An
aspiring kingpin named Nico Rasethuntsha attempted to take
over the area where Vilakazi had been operating, but a few
months later he, too, was assassinated.
In December, 2017, Thapelo Talla, an associate of Khombi’s
who had tried to break away, was gunned down outside a
party for Khombi’s wedding anniversary. The following
month, a syndicate boss known as Majozi disappeared, along
with a policeman who had worked with him; Majozi’s wife
was found dead at their home, and his burned-out BMW was
found near an abandoned hostel. (Informants said afterward
that Majozi and the policeman were tossed down a shaft by
Khombi’s henchmen.) Later, a gold smuggler named Charles
Sithole was murdered after receiving death threats from
Khombi, and a pastor in Thabong who had sold a house to
Khombi, and was requesting the full payment, was shot and
killed.
The incident that led to Khombi’s undoing took place in 2017,
at a cemetery outside Welkom. Like the towns around it, the
cemetery was running to ruin—a metal sign over the
entrance, along with some headstones, had been stolen. The
graves had been racially segregated during apartheid, and
headstones of white people remained clustered at one end.
Khombi suspected one of his lieutenants of stealing money
and gave orders for him to be shot in the cemetery. The body
was discovered the next morning, lying beside an abandoned
vehicle.
One of Khombi’s men, who was at the cemetery that night,
was also working as an informant for the police, and Khombi
was eventually charged with murder. (The first investigating
officer assigned to the case was found guilty of lying under
oath to protect him.) Khombi was held at a local jail, where
wardens delivered KFC to his cell. “They were treating him
like a king,” the expert on the illegal gold trade told me. A
man who was charged alongside Khombi was thought to have
been poisoned—an effort, officials believe, to prevent him
from testifying—and had to be brought to court in a
wheelchair.
The trial began in late 2019. Khombi, who had been released
on bail, showed up in designer suits every day. He presented
himself as a businessman with philanthropic interests,
alleging that he was a victim of a conspiracy. The judge was
unpersuaded. “The entire murder has the hallmark of a hit,”
he declared, sentencing Khombi to life in prison. Khombi’s
legal team is petitioning the courts to overturn this decision,
but he also faces other charges: for the 2017 murder of Talla,
and for identity fraud. (Police discovered two South African
I.D.s in his home, with different names, both featuring his
photograph.)
I returned to Welkom to attend the trials for both cases. Last
September, driving from Johannesburg along the arc of the
Witwatersrand basin, I passed through a series of blighted
mining towns, now home to armies of zama-zamas . It was the
windy season, and clouds of dust blew from the mine dumps.
The waste from South African gold mines is rich in uranium,
and in the nineteen-forties the U.S. and British governments
initiated a top-secret program to reprocess the material for
the development of nuclear weapons. But a large number of
dumps remain, with dangerously high levels of radioactivity.
In Welkom, the dust blows into houses and schools. Some
residential areas have radioactivity readings comparable to
those of Chernobyl.
The magistrate’s court is in the city center—a modernist
building with arresting red metal finishes where thousands of
zama-zamas have been prosecuted. In the halls, there are
posters that read “STOP ILLEGAL MINING, ” with images of gold
in its different forms, from ore concentrate to refined bars.
Outside the courtroom, on the first day of Khombi’s trial for
identity fraud, a garrulous man wearing a kufi hat with a red
feather introduced himself to me as Khombi’s half brother,
although I later found out that he was a more distant relative.
Without my asking, he said of Khombi, “He worked with gold,
I won’t deny it. But he wasn’t a killer.” The problem, he told
me, was the gangs from Lesotho: “He had to work with
them.” Khombi had become rich from the gold trade, and also
arrogant, he added. “But the cops were in his circle. Who’s
the real mafia here?”
Inside, Khombi was in shackles, laughing with the wardens.
He wore a black sweatshirt pulled tight over his muscles, and
his voice boomed across the courtroom. He had already
begun serving his murder sentence, and in prison he was
organizing prayer meetings for the inmates. (Khombi is a
member of an Apostolic church.) Before the trial could begin,
his defense lawyer secured a postponement, and Khombi was
escorted back to the cells.
I was able to speak to Khombi two months later, at the trial
for Talla’s murder. Our conversations took place as he was
led in and out of the courtroom, with his wardens repeatedly
shooing me away. When I introduced myself, Khombi greeted
me like a politician and gave me a warm handshake, as if he
had been expecting me. He denied being a gold dealer, but
said that he knew many people involved in the trade. “From
what I have observed,” he said, “it involves a lot of people—
police, judges, magistrates, security. It’s too dangerous to talk
about.” He also told me, smiling, that he had paid close to a
million dollars for the municipal electricity bill, and made
separate payments for water. “I’m not what all these people
say about me,” he said. “I don’t sit and plot to kill people.”
One day in Welkom, I got lunch with Khombi’s legal adviser, a
smooth-talking former attorney named Fusi Macheka, who
was disbarred in 2011. Macheka is a lay pastor, and he
blessed our food when it arrived. He told me that he had
known Khombi since around 2007, claiming to have
successfully defended him in an illegal-gold-dealing case at
the time. “Ultimately he became my man,” Macheka said. “He
calls me brother.”
While we were talking, a man with heavily scarred forearms
arrived and sat down without greeting me. Macheka
introduced him as Khombi’s lieutenant. “He’s a shock
absorber for him,” Macheka explained. The lieutenant, who
gave his name as Sekonyela, was wearing a yellow golf shirt
that identified him as the chairman of the Stingy Men
Association of Free State, which he was reluctant to elaborate
on. He had known Khombi for close to three decades,
working his way up from being Khombi’s gardener to being
his right-hand man. Through the years, he said, Khombi had
paid for his wedding, including lobola and a honeymoon to
Cape Town, and had given him multiple cars and motorbikes.
A few days later, Sekonyela arrived on one of those bikes, a
Yamaha with a top speed of around a hundred and thirty
miles per hour, to accompany Macheka and me on a tour of
Khombi’s properties. We began at Khombi’s newest home,
purchased from the pastor who was murdered. It featured
the only residential swimming pool in Thabong, Sekonyela
said. A former chief interpreter of the Welkom magistrate’s
court happened to be passing by, and he informed me,
misleadingly, that Khombi was “never ever in court for one
murder.” He added that Khombi had donated soccer balls and
kits for two youth teams he managed. “He was for the
people,” the interpreter said.
Many people in the township shared stories of Khombi’s
generosity and lamented his absence. “He wanted people’s
stomachs to be full,” one community leader said. I heard
about Khombi paying for children to go to school and
providing cattle to slaughter at funerals. Multiple officials I
spoke with believe that Khombi remains active in the illicit
gold trade, organizing deals from inside prison, but I got the
sense that his power had waned. Weeds flourished outside
his properties, and his night clubs were often closed.
Khombi’s incarceration had left room for other syndicates to
grow, but nobody had inherited his mantle as Thabong’s
benefactor. Macheka wanted me to appreciate his client’s
importance in the community, but he was evasive when I
asked if Khombi had been involved in gold smuggling. “I can’t
say that with certainty,” Macheka replied. “According to my
instructions, he was a hard worker.” Macheka also mentioned
that Khombi had given him two cars. “He knew about this
secret of giving,” Macheka had said, a few days earlier. “In
terms of my Biblical unde“He knew about this
secret of giving,” Macheka had said, a few days earlier. “In
terms of my Biblical understanding, you give one cent, you
get a hundredfold. Maybe that was his secret.”
hombi’s murder conviction coincided with a joint
operation, by various police agencies and a private-
security firm contracted by Harmony, to bring illegal
mining in the Free State under control. The project is called
Knock Out, and its logo is a clenched fist. To circumvent the
corruption in Welkom, fifty police officers were brought in
from the city of Bloemfontein, a hundred miles away. The
operation has recorded more than five thousand arrests;
among those taken into custody were seventy-seven mine
employees, forty-eight security officers, and four members of
the military. Investigators opened cases against more than a
dozen police officers. Some cops, in the face of increased
scrutiny, preëmptively quit the force.
Central to the operation was cutting off food supplies for
zama-zamas underground. Investigators raided locations
where food was being packed. In parallel, some of the
operational mines instituted food bans for employees, and
Harmony closed off more entrances to the tunnels. At first,
contractors capped old shafts with slabs of concrete, but
zama-zamas dug underneath and broke these open, so the
contractors began filling the shafts with rubble, sealing them
completely. The company spent two years on one shaft,
pumping in seemingly endless volumes of concrete;
investigators later discovered that, inside the tunnels, zama-
zamas had been removing the slurry before it could set. On
another occasion, a syndicate sent three excavators to reopen
a shaft. Security officers who intervened were shot at and
almost run over by one of the machines. (The driver was later
convicted of attempted murder.) To regain control of the site,
officials sent in helicopters and erected a perimeter of
sandbags—“like an army camp,” one member of the
operation told me.
Sealing vertical shafts restricts access from the surface, but it
does not close the entire tunnel network, and thousands of
zama-zamas remained below Welkom, their food supplies
dwindling. Many still owed money to the syndicates that had
put them underground. They didn’t want to exit. How else
were they going to pay? Jonathan, the former zama-zama ,
estimated that hundreds had died of starvation, including
several of his friends. “The saddest part of it, the most
painful, is that you can’t bury them,” he said.
Burials are of supreme importance in many Southern African
cultures. In the past, when zama-zamas died underground,
their bodies would typically be carried, shrouded in plastic, to
the nearest functioning shaft and left for mine employees to
discover. Affixed to the corpses were labels with a contact
number and a name. The bodies were repatriated to
neighboring countries or buried in the Free State. But now so
many men were dying that it was impossible to collect them
all. Simon, the zama-zama from Zimbabwe, told me that
during 2017 and 2018 more than a hundred men died on just
two levels of the mine he was living in. Using blankets as
stretchers, he and some other zama-zamas had carried out at
least eight bodies, one at a time; each journey had lasted
around twelve hours. “The first time I see a dead body, I’m
scared,” he recalled. As conditions worsened underground—
at one point, Simon went fourteen days without food—he
stopped caring, and would sit on the bodies to rest.
peration Knock Out forced zama-zamas to go elsewhere
in search of gold. Many left for Orkney, a mining town
eighty miles north. One weekend in 2021, according to
the South African Police Service, more than five hundred
zama-zamas exited the tunnels in Orkney after their food and
water supplies were cut off; days later, hundreds of men
attempted to force their way back inside, culminating in a
shoot-out with officials that left six dead. When I visited, a
security officer took me to an abandoned shaft nearby that
had been capped with concrete but blown open by zama-
zamas. Ropes were strung over the mouth of the hole, which
was more than a mile deep. The shaft was no longer
ventilated, and gusts of hot vapor blew up from the tunnels.
Marashean snipers were observing us from a mine dump;
that night, more zama-zamas would lower themselves over
the shaft’s edge.
In Welkom, the drop in illegal mining dealt yet another blow
to an already ravaged economy. “Most of our illegal miners
are our businesspeople,” Rose Nkhasi, the president of the
Free State Goldfields Chamber of Business at the time, told
me. I met her in a boardroom with framed portraits of her
predecessors, almost all of whom were white men. Nkhasi,
who is Black, acknowledged the violence and corruption
associated with gold smuggling, but she was frank about its
role in sustaining Welkom. She singled out Khombi—“He’s
huge in the township, like the biggest mafia”—for his
economic impact. “He employs a lot of people,” she said. “You
can feel his money.”
Nkhasi owns a property with a car wash, a mechanical
workshop, and a restaurant. In earlier years, she told me,
zama-zamas would bring their cars in for repairs and order
food, paying with two-hundred-rand bills—the largest
denomination in South Africa—and declining change. Police
vehicles cruised by to collect payments from Khombi’s
henchmen. Nkhasi also has an independent town-planning
practice, where syndicate leaders often brought her rezoning
applications to build rental units. “They are the ones
developing this town,” Nkhasi told me.
Investigators believe that there are still around two hundred
illegal miners underground, roaming the passages beneath
Welkom; they are adamant that, eventually, many more will
return. The problems are deeply embedded. South Africa,
once the world’s largest gold producer by far, now ranks a
distant tenth. The country is still home to some of the richest
gold deposits in the world, and there are many companies
that would be interested in digging for them. But there is an
increasingly strained relationship between the state and the
mining sector, with ever-shifting policies—including a
requirement that a large number of shares go to historically
disadvantaged South Africans—and the spectre of corruption
acting as deterrents to investment. Margins on gold mines are
thin, and increasing security costs, combined with gold losses
to zama-zamas , can “eliminate most of the profits,” the
former mining chairman told me. “Nobody wants to go into
the casino.” The gold-mining industry has come to symbolize
the dispossession and exploitation that have shaped South
Africa, today the country with the highest income inequality
in the world.
One evening, before sunset, I drove out to an old shaft on the
southern edge of Welkom. Sunk in the early nineteen-fifties, it
once led to one of South Africa’s richest mines, producing
thousands of tons of ore per day. The shaft was filled a few
years ago, and all that remains is a low mound in the middle
of a grassy field. Nearby, at a venue called Diggers Inn, where
Khombi held his wedding, an end-of-year celebration was
kicking off for the graduates of Welkom High School. A crowd
had gathered to cheer for the teen-agers, many of whom had
hired chauffeured cars. Not two thousand feet away, at the
opposite end of the shaft, some men were at work with picks
and shovels, scraping gold from the earth. “After the Gold Rush.”